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THE PLACE OF LAW IN SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION:
A COMMENTARY ON DEAN SCHOTTLAND'S ARTICLE
EDWARD V. SPARER*
I
N assessing the kind of contribution legal and social work education-and
professional activities-may make to each other, it is useful to reassess the
meaning of the much abused terms "interprofessional cooperation," and "inter-
professional conflict." Dean Schottland points out, quite appropriately, that
during the first three decades of this century, many social workers had good
cause for distress over the role played by courts "and even lawyers," with re-
gard to such progressive social legislation as workmen's compensation, child
labor and minimum wage legislation. The obvious and important (though
easily forgotten) point should be added, however, that the conflict was not
between the social work and legal "professions" as such. Surely it was true
that some lawyers were equally distressed by the decisions Dean Schottland
commented upon, that some of those lawyers had drafted the legislation in
question, that other lawyers represented the losing side, that some judges
vigorously dissented from the type of judicial decisions in question,1 and that
other courts (albeit a minority of them) spoke in at least as vigorous a man-
ner as the social workers and applied constitutional concepts to the maxium
advantage of potential social welfare beneficiaries. 2 The conflict over the
social legislation to which Dean Schottland referred existed within the legal
profession just as it existed within the whole of American society.
The same point ought to be made about the nature of the so-called
"cooperation" between "law" and "social work" taking place today. A "hit
theme throughout the country," Dean Schottland emphasizes. Yet, much of
the relationship at issue is not "cooperation" at all. What has taken place,
especially within the last three years, is increasing criticism and legal attack
by some elements of the legal profession upon some rather long standing regu-
lations and practices implemented-and, in important ways originated-by
some social workers. (Most of the recent court actions cited by Dean Schott-
land, as well as other extremely significant actions, s illustrate this assertion.)
Other social workers have played important roles in supporting such legal
* Senior Fellow and Lecturer, Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Holmes' well-known dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
2. See, e.g., Sacramento Orphanage & Children's Home v. Chambers 25 Cal. App. 536,
144 P. 317 (Dist. Ct. App. 1914).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (N.D., Ala. 1967), probable jurisdiction
noted, 88 S. Ct. 821 (1968), involving a "substitute father" or "man-in-the-house" issue
in public welfare. As will be noted subsequently in the text, comparable eligibility rules
were strongly supported and to some extent originated by early social work leaders. There
are still importantly placed social workers, for example those who lead some of the state
welfare departments, who are enamoured of such rules.
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criticism. 4 The cooperation that has been developing in the very recent past
has been between only certain elements of the legal and social work profes-
sions.
Insofar as professions which deal with human values-such as law and
social work-are concerned, there is no such thing as cooperation between
the professions on significant matters. To be sure, semantical difficulties may
be relieved, mutual referral systems increased etc.5 But on the many large and
unresolved social issues of concern to both professions, it is cooperation between
like-minded professionals (and not the professions) which is relevant. If we
would strip away the vague jargon which we usually use in approaching such
issues-and examine what happens within each of our professions with regard
to major social concerns-we might agree that each profession is suffering (or
benefiting) from a deep division over its values, over the contribution the pro-
fession has to make towards a democratic society, over the meaning of a demo-
cratic society. In each profession there are persons who, in their professional
philosophy and concerns, relate more closely to many in the other professions
then to some of their professional brothers. Insofar as we are willing to accept
this "fact of life" (fact of professional life) to that extent-and not much
further-will we be able to work out sensible and useful means of cooperation
between lawyers and social workers.
II
"Memories died hard," Dr. Schottland said, and he reminded us to bear
in mind certain judicial decisions so that we may appreciate the "jaundiced
attitude" some social workers have toward the legal profession. Subject to the
qualification argued above, his reminder is fair enough. However, so that we
might better understand the cause of some of the legal attacks on welfare prac-
tices now taking place, and so that we might better understand at least one view
of what role the law might play in social work curriculum, let me briefly trace
a major anti-democratic aspect of much social work ideology and practice as
it appeared historically and as it still appears today.
Briefly, and perhaps crudely put, the social work ideology to which I
refer holds as follows: Those who have public or quasi-public power-at least
when they are well-trained social workers-should use that power to determine
the place, manner and habits of life for those who are helpless and dependent
because of poverty or other misfortunes of circumstance. The theory has been
and is that there are "scientific" ways, through the use of "social diagnosis"
or whathaveyou, for determining what is in a powerless person's "best interests."
This being the case, the fruits of public power-be they welfare grants, public
4. W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children (1965) is illustrative of the excellent contribu-
tions made by many social workers for our national and humane welfare policy making.
S. A useful article illustrating the value of improved referral systems is Fogelson
and Freeman, Legal Knowledge and Casework With Delinquent Adolescents and Their
Families, in Controlling Delinquents (S. Wheeler, ed. 1966).
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housing apartments or whathaveyou-- should be used to bring about conformity
with those interests.6
Such a "best interests" theory for the use of public power became a major
force in social work thinking in America and in England at the beginning
of this century. Among its progenitors were such outstanding English social
workers as Octavia Hill, who opposed the right to vote for those who were
medically needy on the ground that it was not in the best interests of the
poor to remove such deterrents to "dependency." 7
Mary Richmond gave "scientific" content to the theory I describe in her
classic text, Social Diagnosis," which for many years served as the social case-
worker's "bible." Two of the truly outstanding social workers in America, Edith
Abbott and Sophonisba Breckinredge, gave clear expression to the coercive
aspects of social work ideology in their arguments that mother's pensions should
be given only to those mothers who are "worthy" and conform to moral condi-
tions promulgated by program administrators. 9 Indeed, in a review of social
work literature between 1911 and 1935, only one dissenting opinion was found
to their view that financial aid for needy children should be conditioned
upon the moral behavior of their parents.10 (It was this latter social work view
which gave rise to our current "substitute-father" rules, now under court attack).
The ideology I refer to has been responsible for the denial of welfare aid
to many thousands of citizens newly arriving in New York from other states
but until two years ago, not on the ground of the typical public assistance
residence rule-but on the ground that it was not in the "best interests" or
"socially valid" for these newcomers to live in New York.' The ideology
in issue has been used to justify the seizure of children by welfare departments
without court adjudication and it has been used to justify the imposition of
psychiatric and "rehabilitative" services without the consent of the public
assistance recipients upon whom such "services" have been imposed. It has
also been responsible for the violation by welfare officials of statutorily imposed
duties to keep recipient caserecords confidential in instances where prison parole
officers seek information (relevant to a decision to recommend parole for an
incarcerated man), where public housing authority agents seek information
(which may be used to evict a family on the ground that its members are
6. Of course, here too there are those who share such a philosophy within the legal
profession. See, e.g., the lower court's opinion on why the presence of two or more illegiti-
mate children in one family constitutes-without more-legal neglect, Matter of Cager,
No. 353 (Md. Ct. App. 1967).
7. See Hill, Memorandum, in Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws 678
(1909).
8. M. Richmond, Social Diagnosis (1917).
9. See G. Abbott & L. Breckinridge, The Administration of the Aid-To-Mother's Law
in Illinois (1921).
10. W. Bell, supra note 4, at 29.
11. See Sparer, The New Public Law, in The Extension of Legal Services to the
Poor 26, 28 (1964).
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"undesirable"), and where other "social agencies"-public and private-seek
information about their "clients" without bothering to obtain their consent.
A recent, somewhat astonishing-yet I fear not atypical-application of
coercive "best interest" ideology in social work occurred recently in Texas. A
young mother of an illegitimate child applied for AFDC aid. She was told by the
local welfare agency that she must make a "personal effort" to bring the father
to the welfare department. The mother explained that this was quite difficult
for her, though she willingly supplied the father's address to the agency. Her
story was that the father, who had been courting her, terminated the relation-
ship with her after the pregnancy occurred two years prior to the AFDC appli-
cation. The father subsequently married another woman. The mother said that
she felt unable to visit this man and hold a rational conversation with him.
The welfare agency stated that a state regulation required that her application
be rejected unless she personally called upon the father. When a legal aid lawyer
wrote to the state welfare department, asking for an explanation of the regu-
lation, the reply quoted section 2642.60 of the Texas Public Welfare Manual,
which requires a mother of an illegitimate child to make such "an effort" and
added, "there are many sound reasons behind this policy." What were the
reasons? I quote the four reasons offered:12
1. The involvement of the client in her own application is a well
known and well accepted social work principle. The application
process is regarded as a cooperative worker-client effort. It is in
this process that the client-worker relationship is built and such
a relationship is regarded by most workers, therapists, etc. as the
mode of bringing about change within the client.
2. Since the direction in AFDC is toward self-help, the requirement
of having the mother contact the father is a step in this direction.
If, through her efforts, child support can be obtained it is some-
thing in which she can take pride-that is, she has helped herself
and has not been entirely dependent upon others for help.
3. Since the mother knows the father, her contact with him would
have the advantage of this contact being more meaningful to him
than a contact with a stranger in the form of a caseworker.
4. As you know in the case of illegitimate children, the father is
under no legal obligation to support. If child support is brought
about it would be with casework effort. It is believed that the
mother's help is needed to help us get in touch with him to help
bring about this needed support.
And the letter went on to add:
I do not see that the man's being married per se would have any effect
on the policy. Many of our applicants telephoned absent fathers on
his job to advise him of our desire to speak to him.
When I read the letter from the Texas welfare official to the casework
12. A copy of the text of the Texas welfare department's letter is in the writer's
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section of the faculty of a leading social work school, its members were out-
raged. They urged that such thinking represented very bad social work analysis
indeed. So too, however, do those thoughts of Octavia Hill, Mary Richmond,
Edith Abbott, Sophonisha Breckinredge and others to which I earlier referred.
The error lies not simply in the particular result (denial of AFDC aid to the
mother described above; the various "substitute father" rules; invasions of
confidentiality; eligibility for public assistance made dependent upon "social
validity" of a new residence). Rather, I would argue, the error is found in the
very notion that public officials-be they social workers or other persons-may
use public assistance or other need programs to compel changes in living pat-
terns and standards of personal behavior. Once that notion is accepted (and
many social workers-and lawyers-do accept it), the arbitrary results referred
to above become as inevitable as taxes and death.
A great many more examples of "best interest" practices on the part of
social workers could be cited (including some which are deceptively attractive).
The point, however, should be clear. Under the guise of "social work," a variety
of coercive practices have developed which tend to and do result in a loss
of self-determination and full citizenship for those impoverished citizens who
are dependent upon public aid. Since such "social work" practices are based
upon governmental power, they necessarily involve law as well as social work-
and issues of "good" law or "bad" law, just as they involve issues of "good"
social work or "bad" social work. It is for this reason that some lawyers are
beginning to involve themselves in legal attacks on some social work practices.
III
Obviously members of both professions who are concerned with democratic
values, have a lot of relevant thinking and fruitful collaboration to engage in.
This collaboration ought to unfold upon many different levels.
There is, for example, an impelling need for exploration by members of
both professions, with others, of such issues of legal and social policy as:
Should we separate programs of social treatment and rehabilitation from
programs for material need? If so (as I think), how can we best go about it?
Parenthetically, it should be added, the current congressional trend seems to
be that of merging such programs more so than ever before.13
Serious research on a wide number of pressing social and legal issues has
been conspicuously absent. For example, we now have a national legislative
policy aimed at coercing work by mothers of young children receiving AFDC.
This newly adopted policy reverses that policy adopted in 1935. It is time we
found out about the effects of coerced work on mothers and their children.
14
13. See, e.g., Pub. Law 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1968) (the 1967 amendments to the
Social Security Act).
14. A current federal case involving this issue is Anderson v. Schaeffer, Civil No.
10443 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
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Even considering my negative remarks on certain aspects of social work
ideology-and those of Dean Schottland on past judicial trends-there have been
many in the history of both the legal and social work professions who have
been concerned with justice for the poor. The task of building adequate institu-
tions for justice ought not to be left to lawyers alone. The legal profession
alone cannot even supply the number and kind of advocates who are needed
to represent poor persons. Lay advocacy, including social work advocacy, might
be developed on a large scale for a wide variety of matters. Such lay advocacy
would not be in place of lawyers' advocacy, for many of the matters needing
advocacy today are left totally untended. 1 At the least, interested members of
both professions ought to start the process of serious exploration and experi-
mentation.16
There are many within our two professions-and elsewhere-who are com-
mitted to making our beneficial social welfare laws work as they were intended,
not as they actually do, and who are committed to examining and changing
our more oppressive laws. The need for interaction, joint action and research
among these social work and legal professionals is overwhelming. It is in this
context, that I would like to turn to Dean Schottland's proposal concerning a
course on law and social work in the social work schools.
IV
My own notion of a one course version of law and social work, with which
I experimented for two years at Columbia's School of Social Work, is some-
what different from Dean Schottland's. The course did not aim at covering many
of the items subsumed in Dean Schottland's thirteen areas. Rather, I selected
those areas where social workers have exercised public or quasi-public power-
such as welfare administration, educational suspension proceedings, public
housing review boards, juvenile courts, child welfare and custody agencies-and
aimed at sensitizing the students to the kind of issues regarding statutory and
constitutional rights. which exist in those areas. The course was concerned with
examining the relevance of due process and equal protection concepts, among
other things, to the dignity and self-determination of the citizens who were the
subjects of that public power. It attempted to trace the deep conflict over
whether and how such public power should be imposed on citizens by admin-
istrative boards and'courts. My own presentations were frankly partisan-
however much I encouraged disagreement. I sought to suggest why there was
reason to believe we are at the beginning of a judicial revolution in social
welfare, how social workers might assist in that "revolution," and what the
relevance of such judicial change might be to social workers.
16. See Sparer, Thorkelson & Weiss, The Lay Advocate, 43 Detroit L. J. 493 (1966).
16. One of the very few experimentals dealing with lay advocacy has been success-
fully made by the Dixwell Legal Rights Ass'n in New Haven, Conn. Welfare rights organi-
zations throughout the country also engage in lay advocacy on a daily basis.
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There was, by the way, no antagonism on the part of the social work
students. The course was regularly oversubscribed. The students were enthusi-
astic-in certain ways, too much so. The students were also important sources
of information to me. For term paper assignments, they took the issues we
had discussed in class and analyzed the operations of the (field work) agencies
to which they had been assigned by the school: The data which they produced,
still sitting idly in my files, constitutes in my opinion an enormously rich mine
of information on the day to day problems of legal rights and protections in a
welfare society.
Nevertheless, this Columbia course barely scratched the surface of what
ought to be done with law in the social work schools. While I agree with Dean
Schottland that school curriculum is already overcrowded, and one cannot keep
adding course after course, there is an alternative to the new course versus
many new courses argument. Such an alternative would keep a single course
for the purpose of focus, and introduce "legal" issues more expansively by intro-
ducing relevant material and teaching throughout the whole of the established
curriculum. There is little in the casework and community organization areas
to which such an approach would not be relevant.
For example, Columbia offers a course entitled "Casework with psychotic
and borderline clients." I have some difficulty understanding how caseworkers
could be granted a masters degree with the intent of specializing in the area indi-
cated by this course and its related courses, without an extensive examination of
such matters as: The standards, and the "legal" issues they pose, for mental
commitment; the rights of persons subjected to the commitment process; the re-
lationship between medical authority to impose "treatment" and the known effi-
cacy of such trdatment; the "rights" of patients to be free from experimentation
without consent; the meaning of consent in such areas; the "right" of patients
to know what is being done to them; "confidentiality" restrictions between the
doctor, the patient, the medical caseworker and client in the mental hospital;
the policy disputes regarding patient role in decision making and its implica-
tions for the legal authority of the mental hospital on a variety of matters.
Such issues are not being examined today. They are fundamental to good case-
work. They cannot be handled adequately in a general legal survey course. They
belong directly within courses on psychiatric casework.
Of course, it is true that any concerned social work school, adopting the
kind of approach suggested above, will have difficulty (at first) obtaining
adequate materials and teachers. It is more than unlikely, however, that such ma-
terials and teachers will ever appear until a demand is made for them. Those
many social workers and lawyers who share a common concern for the dignity
and social welfare of man have begun a limited amount of cooperation-and have
introduced a certain amount of appropriate initial conflict with others. This
limited initial experience will not flower until the schools take a far more ambi-
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tious approach to the mutual relevance of law and social work than any hitherto
attempted.
V
My principal regret with these articles is their primary concern with the
need for "law" in the social work schools. At least as important, perhaps more
so if my lawyer prejudices are valid, is the need to examine the relevance of
social work-social policy matters in the law schools. The latter issue, unfor-
tunately, has not yet reached even the level of serious discussion.
